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SUMMARYArguments about structural policies in Europe, including the EU’s
Lisbon strategy, put a legitimate emphasis on labour and product market
reforms, but often overlook the role of the financial system in fostering
innovation and growth. Corporate finance is crucial for the emergence of new
companies, well beyond the much-analysed technology sector.In a
knowledge economy where companies rely less on physical investment,
traditional bank loans are insufficient. While Europe has a world-class
financial system for established companies, new instruments tailored to the
needs of emerging firms remain underdeveloped in most EU countries.
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To improve financing for high-growth-
potential emerging companies, policy-
makers should focus on the legal and
regulatory environment and on mar-
ket incentives, rather than on subsi-
dies or other direct intervention. Key
areas for policy action include compe-
tition among intermediaries, securi-
ties regulation, insolvency legislation,
taxes, and prudential rules. More gen-
erally, the ability to foster corporate
growth should be given higher priority
in EU financial policy, alongside exist-
ing objectives of financial integration
and stability. Even if decisions fall
within the national remit, information,
benchmarking and discussion at
European level would enhance the
prospects of reform.
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Fig 1: ‘Population pyramid’ for largest
US/European companies
Horizontal bars show the number of
companies in each age category.
Source: Bruegel, based on FT Global 500 ranking of the
world’s largest listed companies, 30 September 2007.b
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FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
EUROPE is widely recognised as
suffering from economic inertia.
Felipe Gonzalez, the former
Spanish prime minister who now
chairs a committee tasked with
charting the future of the EU, has
recently declared: “Europe suffers
from extraordinary corporate
rigidity. And I am not only talking
about the power of trade unions
and labour rights. [...] Business,
labour and political elites protect
each other. We stifle innovation.
That is why Europe has failed to
produce a Bill Gates”
1.
The financial sector is key to
unlocking Europe’s growth poten-
tial. Even taking into account con-
troversies generated by the
current securitisation crisis,
America’s constantly self-rein-
venting corporate finance industry
is often quoted as a crucial source
of business dynamism. But dis-
cussions about structural reform
in Europe, including the EU’s
Lisbon strategy, treat the financial
system mostly as an afterthought:
none of the strategy’s 24 current
‘integrated guidelines for growth
and jobs’ (2005-08) specifically
focuses on finance
2. While the
high-technology sector has been
the focus of some attention, there
is a startling lack of policy-relevant
data when it comes to the financ-
ing of emerging companies more
generally
3. By underestimating the
link between financial
development and growth, policy-
makers have neglected an impor-
tant policy lever for achieving
higher growth and employment in
Europe.
In this Policy Brief, we consider
how Europe’s financial system can
foster the growth of emerging
companies, irrespective of the
technological content of their
activities. Our focus on corporate
finance deliberately leaves impor-
tant policy questions, not to men-
tion cultural factors, out of the
scope of this brief
4. In particular,
measures specifically targeted at
high-technology companies and
their link with university research
and ‘innovation ecosystems’ are
not dealt with here. Also outside
our scope are questions related to
the size of lead markets for emerg-
ing firms, including how public pro-
curement may help provide lead
markets, an idea often raised in
broader discussions about a
‘European Small Business Act’
5. 
1. ESTABLISHED AND EMERGING
FIRMS
Europe’s corporate landscape is
dominated by old, established
companies. A look at the age distri-
bution of the world’s 500 largest
listed companies shows that
European ‘champions’ are general-
ly much older than American ones,
let alone those from emerging
markets, as illustrated by Figure 1
(cover page). Strikingly, Europe’s
corporate giants include only 12
companies born in the second half
of the twentieth century, against
51 in the US and 46 in emerging
countries; of these, only three
were created after 1975 in Europe,
compared with 26 in the US and 21
in emerging markets. 
The prominent old, established
firms which form most of Europe’s
large-company landscape are
doing well in the global competi-
tion, even better by some meas-
ures than their US counterparts. As
Figure 2 illustrates, their relative
weight in the global ‘top 500’ has
slightly increased in the past half-
decade, while that of US ‘champi-
ons’ has declined almost continu-
ously as companies from emerg-
ing economies have gradually
taken their place. Exchange rate
fluctuations play a role but do not
explain the trend, since much of
the decline occurred in 2004-06, a
period when the euro/dollar parity
was fairly stable at around $1.2-
1.3 for one euro. 
In fact, large US companies are not
only being challenged from abroad
but also from within: Figure 3
shows the constantly increasing
rate of turnover in the highest
ranks of US business. While in
1Quoted in Financial
Times, ‘Rebel seeks
innovators to shake up
Europe’, 15 January
2008.
2http://ec.europa.eu/
growthandjobs/
3GHK/Technopolis,
‘Evaluation of data and
sources underlying the
analysis of market
gaps in access to
finance for SMEs in the
EU’, report for the
European Commission,
July 2007.   
4See Philippe Aghion, A
Primer on Innovation
and Growth, Bruegel
Policy Brief 2006/06,
October 2006.
5Communication of the
European Commission,
‘A Single Market for
21st Century Europe’,
20 November 2007.
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Figure 2: Breakdown of total market capitalisation of FT Global 500 CompaniesFINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
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6See for example Pour
une nouvelle politique
industrielle, report of
the committee chaired
by Jean-Louis Beffa on
behalf of the French
government, La
Documentation
Française, 2005.
7Capitalism, Socialism
and Democracy
(1942).
8Lucia Foster, John
Haltiwanger and C.J.
Krizan, ‘Aggregate
Productivity Growth:
Lessons from
Microeconomic
Evidence’ NBER
Working Paper
No.6803, 2000.
9Kathy Fogel, Randall
Morck and Bernard
Yeung, ‘Big Business
Stability and Economic
Growth: Is What's Good
for General Motors Good
for America?’ NBER
Working Paper
No.12394, 2006.
10Daron Acemoglu,
Philippe Aghion and
Fabrizio Zilibotti,
‘Distance to Frontier,
Selection, and
Economic Growth’,
NBER working paper
No.9066, 2002.
11See note 8.
Europe the largest companies are
likely to stay on top for a long
period, in the US they are vigorous-
ly challenged by new entrants and
also by their own shareholders,
who often force them to divest
non-core activities or to split into
separate entities. Similar pres-
sures are mounting in Europe but
remain less powerful than in
America. 
Does this matter for growth? An
influential school of thought in
Europe maintains that large
companies are better able to inno-
vate because they can hedge risks
internally and cross-subsidise
innovation with surpluses from
mature divisions
6. An alternative
view, associated with Austrian
economist Joseph Schumpeter,
argues that “the process of cre-
ative destruction is the essential
fact of capitalism”
7.
Recent economic research has
generally tended to confirm
Schumpeter’s argument, while
making it more precise and more
quantitative. Using establishment-
level data, a seminal work in 2000
found that one-third to one-half of
aggregate productivity growth in
US manufacturing is directly due to
reallocation between firms, cre-
ation of new firms, and disappear-
ance of unsuccessful ones
8. More
recent research found that coun-
tries where big companies are
more likely to be challenged and
displaced experience higher pro-
ductivity and income growth
9.
Moreover, there are several good
reasons to expect creative
destruction to become more
important for Europe today than it
has been in past decades. First,
the development of financial mar-
kets has decreased the impor-
tance of risk diversification inside
large firms, as there are now other
ways to mitigate risk than in-
house hedging. Second, since the
end of the catch-up period that fol-
lowed the second world war, most
European countries compete close
to the ‘technology frontier’ where
innovation-based strategies are
crucial, and innovation is often dis-
ruptive rather than incremental
10.
And third, reallocation effects are
stronger in the fast-growing
service sector than in
manufacturing
11.
As the age distribution in Figure 1
suggests, young companies gen-
erally find it harder to emerge in
Europe than in the US. More specif-
ically, many new firms are created
in Europe, but thereafter they tend
to grow less briskly than in other
economies. Figure 4 illustrates
this on the basis of company-level
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Source: update (including 2007 data) of figure 4 in Diego Comin and Thomas Philippon, “The Rise in
Firm-Level Volatility: Causes and Consequences”, NBER Working Paper No.11388, 2005. Industry
leaders are firms in the top 20% of their industry based on market value. The figure shows the prob-
ability that a current industry leader exits from this group within the next 3 years. This turnover
measure displays a clear upward trend over the post-war period. It is also procyclical, suggesting
that leaders are more likely to be challenged in booms than in recessions.
Figure 3: Turnover at the top of US industry rankings since 1958
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The bars represent average firm size relative to size at creation. Source: Eric Bartelsman, John
Haltiwanger and Stefano Scarpetta, "Microeconomic Evidence of Creative Destruction in Industrial
and Developing Countries", IZA Discussion paper No 1374, 2004. N.B. Methodologies may differ from
one country to another as regards the definition of size at creation.
Figure 4: Average growth of successful firms, selected countries, 1980-2000b
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FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
data analysed by the OECD. Among
those firms that survive in the
years following their creation, the
pace of growth is much quicker in
the United States. 
Of course, there would be no point
in penalising Europe’s large and
successful established companies
in a context of fierce global compe-
tition. But it is in the interests of
growth and job creation in Europe
that new firms can challenge
established positions. 
Emerging firms should
not be confused with
small- and medium-
sized enterprises
(SMEs). Many SMEs
are comfortable in
their local niche, however small,
and show no willingness or poten-
tial to grow. Many emerging firms,
also, have already grown beyond
the European thresholds that pro-
vide a formal definition of SMEs
(fewer than 250 employees, maxi-
mum €50m in sales or €43m in
balance-sheet total). ‘Emerging’
firms are not meant here as a
statistical category, but as those
firms which are involved in a
growth dynamic, for which they
often need external financing. The
rest of this Policy Brief is devoted
to understanding better how the
growth of these emerging firms, as
opposed to established ones, is
affected by the design of Europe’s
financial system.
2. THE FINANCIAL NEEDS OF
EMERGING FIRMS
How much of the gap in emerging
firms’ growth in the US and Europe
is due to differences in financial
systems, rather than other
factors? More research than is
currently available is needed on
this question. One study suggests
that, in terms of obstacles to
growth, financial constraints are
at least as important as labour
market rigidities when observed
over a sample of companies
across different countries
12. To be
sure, other obstacles to emerging
firms are significant, including, in
Europe: barriers to entry and
imperfect competition in markets
for goods and services; labour
market constraints that discour-
age hiring in a risky
environment; the
stigma attached to
failure, prejudices
against rapidly-earned
wealth, and a general
lack of recognition of
entrepreneurs in cultural and
social frameworks; and a paternal-
istic management culture that
emphasises control over local
empowerment and delegation,
which is incompatible with fast
growth. There is no contradiction
between recognising the undeni-
able impact of all these non-
financial factors, and emphasising
the importance of adequate corpo-
rate finance.
The relative underde-
velopment of Europe’s
financial sector is
sometimes presented
as a chicken-and-egg
problem: is there little
entrepreneurship
because there is no venture-
capital market? Or no venture
capital because there are no entre-
preneurs? This way of framing the
issue largely misses the point,
which is about the dynamics cre-
ated by appropriate incentives.
Emblematically, initial public offer-
ings (IPOs) in the US play a key
role in motivating young people to
look for ideas and start
companies. Without a vibrant exit
market, investors might not see
many entrepreneurs asking for
finance. The academic literature of
the past decade has robustly
established that financial
development is not only the conse-
quence of growth but also a
cause
13.
Established and emerging firms do
not rely on the same financial
instruments to meet their
development needs. Established
firms are often publicly listed, with
a liquid market for their shares;
many of them are rated and have
access to the corporate bond mar-
ket; they can tap the savings of
worldwide investors through the
highly efficient European whole-
sale markets, whose
competitiveness gap with the US
has now almost completely
disappeared
14. 
Moreover, established firms
typically generate significant cash
flows and are therefore less
dependent on external funds for
expansion. Their issuance of secu-
rities is often linked
with acquisitions; oth-
erwise they rather buy
back shares or distrib-
ute dividends. By con-
trast, emerging firms
typically display low
levels of cash flows
and have limited or no access to
wholesale capital markets,
because the implied transaction
costs are often prohibitive for
small firms. Therefore, the need to
find tailor-made solutions for their
financing is crucial for their
development. 
‘Young companies
find it harder to
emerge in Europe
than in the US.’
‘Financial
development is not
only a consequence
of growth, but also
a cause.’
12Philippe Aghion,
Thibault Fally and
Stefano Scarpetta,
‘Credit Constraint as a
Barrier to the Entry and
Post-Entry Growth of
Firms’, Economic Policy
22/52, October 2007.
13Ross Levine, ‘Finance
and Growth: Theory and
Evidence’, NBER
Working Paper
No.W10766, September
2004.
14See for example
‘Sustaining New York’s
and the US’ Global
Financial Services
Leadership’, report by
McKinsey for Mayor
Michael Bloomberg and
Senator Charles
Schumer, January
2007.FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
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One way to gauge the importance
of access to finance is to study the
investment of firms that do not
have enough cash flows to cover
their capital expenditures. Figure 5
shows the share of total invest-
ment accounted for by firms in the
US whose cash flows cover less
than one third of their capital
expenditures. This share has risen
over the post-war period, suggest-
ing an increased ability of the
financial sector to provide these
firms with adequate funding to
finance their investment. This con-
trasts with the 1950s and 1960s,
when investment was mostly
done by firms with large cash
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Source: Adapted from Thomas Philippon, “Why Has The U.S. Financial Sector Grown So Much?”,
Working paper, NYU-Stern, 2007, available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/research.htm.
The line shows the fraction of total investment done by firms whose cash flows are less than one
third of their capital expenditures. Unfortunately, no comparable information is currently available
for Europe. 
Figure 5: Share of low cash firms in total investment, 1955-2005
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Source: Thomson Financial, EVCA, NVCA / PricewaterhouseCoopers
Figure 6: US-EU comparison, selected investment flows, 2005-2006
mainly in intangibles that can less
easily be used as collateral.
Leasing, another popular financ-
ing solution, is also inaccessible to
firms that do not invest in tangible
assets. 
Thus, today’s emerging firms need
financial instruments that are
typically less senior than debt
backed with physical assets. The
US financial system has evolved
quickly to provide these new solu-
tions, such as high-yield bonds,
mezzanine debt
15, and private
equity. Figure 6 shows the com-
paratively low level of
development of subordinated
financial offerings, which are more
specifically suited to emerging
firms, in Europe relative to the US.
This does not contradict the fact
that, at least until recent market
developments, most
of Europe’s SMEs
(including in central
and eastern Europe)
have not felt an alarm-
ing level of credit con-
straint
16. This fact,
while accurate, overlooks the con-
centration of financial constraints
on firms with a high growth poten-
tial, which constitute only a minor-
ity of all enterprises and generally
escape statistical categorisation. 
The relative underdevelopment of
financial services for emerging
firms in Europe is aggravated by
sharp intra-European hetero-
geneities. In the private equity
segment, Figure 7, overleaf, shows
the widely varying levels of
intensity of professional equity
investments in emerging
companies: at early stage, during
or shortly after creation, and in
their phases of expansion (other
large segments of private equity
flows and there was not much
need for financial intermediation. 
In the industrial age,
emerging firms could
finance their needs for
investment, in spite of
low cash flows, by
pledging new equip-
ment as collateral to
obtain bank loans. But for service
companies, which account for the
bulk of today’s growth in devel-
oped countries, or at the high end
of manufacturing activities (such
as design, research and
development, and supply chain
management), investment is
‘Today’s emerging
firms need new
financial solutions.’
15Mezzanine debt
typically includes
warrants attached (or
equity co-investments)
to the debt obligation,
along with the interest
payment associated
with debt.
16See for example Flash
Eurobarometer, ‘SME
Access to Finance’,
October 2005.FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
b
r
u
e
g
e
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
b
r
i
e
f 06
finance, such as leveraged buy-
outs and restructuring, are
excluded as they are less focused
on emerging firms). While the
United Kingdom and Nordic coun-
tries generally display high
private-equity activity, the level is
lower in the rest of
western Europe, and
very low in central
and eastern Europe.
No comparable data
are available for
other types of
financing aimed at
emerging
companies, but it is
likely that similar geographical
imbalances would also be
observed. Geography matters,
because corporate finance for
growing firms often requires phys-
ical proximity and ‘soft’ informa-
tion. As a result, heterogeneity of
development is unlikely to be off-
set by the provision of financial
services across borders. 
3.  HOW PUBLIC POLICY CAN HELP
Public policy can be a crucial
enabler of financial and economic
development, but it needs to stay
up to date. During their catch-up
growth in the post-war period, a
time of capital
scarcity, European
countries relied on a
range of public-
sector financing
instruments such as
state banks, sub-
sidised loans, or
public loan guaran-
tees. Some of these
instruments are still useful and
can address market failures at
early stages of firms’
development. The principle of sub-
sidiarity should apply, and coun-
tries and local communities may
want to be active in co-invest-
ments with private funds or loan
guarantees as long as they remain
compatible with EU competition
policy and state aid rules. But it is
not obvious that EU-led pro-
grammes of direct funding to
SMEs, such as the European
Investment Bank’s Global Loans or
the European Commission’s
Competitiveness and Innovation
Programme, can have much direct
impact on SME growth, even in a
tightening credit environment.
Moreover, experience has taught
time and again that incumbents
are much better tooled than new
entrants to capture the bulk of
public support programmes.
Rather than aiming at direct
intervention, public policy should
focus on levelling the playing field
for the optimal allocation of capital
and the provision of tailored
financing solutions to emerging
firms, without artificial restrictions
or distortions. Policy should facili-
tate the entry of investors when
they are most needed for the
development of companies, and
their exit when other types of
investors are better suited. While
keeping appropriate
oversight to ensure
financial stability – a
prominent aspect
these days – policy-
makers should create
an environment that
favours financial flexi-
bility and innovation,
especially in corporate
finance, in order to
allow low-cash firms to
invest, grow and drive
the whole economy for-
ward in Europe as they
have in the US.
Therefore, we suggest
that orientation of the
financial system
towards growth, offer-
ing optimal financial
‘Rather than direct
intervention, public
policy should focus on
levelling the playing
field.’
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Figure 7: Private equity investment flows (% of GDP), 2004-2006FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
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Residential mortgages 56%
Commercial mortgages 13%
Collateralised loan/debt
obligations 11%
SME loans 7%
Automobile loans 2%
Other 11%
17See Elena Carletti,
Philipp Hartmann &
Steven Ongena, ‘The
Economic Impact of
Merger Control: What is
Special about
Banking?’, European
Central Bank Working
Paper No.786, July
2007.
18See for instance
‘Submission on
Insolvency Law
Reform’, European High
Yield Association
(EHYA), April 2007,
available at
http://www.ehya.com/
ads/PressRelease/
Lette_UK_Treasury_April_
2007.pdf.
solutions to emerging firms, be
elevated to a top-level priority of
financial policy in the European
Union and its member states,
alongside the existing policy
objectives of financial integration
and stability. This amounts to a
substantial reform programme,
which this Policy Brief can only
tentatively outline. It encompass-
es a number of legislative and
regulatory areas which have a
major impact on corporate finance.
• Competition policy is perhaps
the most crucial enabler. In the
European financial sector, com-
petition has long been stifled
by rigid prudential considera-
tions, some of which are no
longer justified
17. Adequately
supervised non-banking enti-
ties should be allowed to com-
pete with banks on a wide
range of services, eliminating
current distortions: for exam-
ple, non-banks are still prohibit-
ed from offering leasing or fac-
toring services in Austria,
France, Italy and Portugal. As
banks rethink their business
models in the wake of the
current financial crisis, diversi-
fication of corporate finance
offerings by a wider variety of
providers would foster
innovation, as is the case in
Europe’s wholesale financial
markets, most strikingly in the
City of London.
• Securities regulationis another
high-impact area. As far as
capital markets are concerned,
the logic of regulation should be
changed. Instead of having
strong regulations with excep-
tions for small firms, who then
need legal advice to understand
not only the rules but also the
exceptions, it would be more
efficient to have basic rules for
everyone, and then add obliga-
tions for large companies, if
necessary. A ‘light-touch’
regime of regulation for shares
traded among professional
investors should be
implemented at EU
level to leverage the
scale effects of a
cross-border market
for shares of emerg-
ing firms. Part of the
reason why the success of the
London Stock Exchange’s
Alternative Investment Market
(AIM) has not been replicated
on the continent lies in frag-
mented and excessively pre-
scriptive national regulations.
Also, an appropriate regulatory
framework could help develop
corporate-loan securitisation,
which is currently a tiny frac-
tion of total securitisation in
Europe as Table 1 illustrates.
Securitisation has acquired a
bad reputation since the start
of the subprime crisis, but it
remains a unique technique for
allocating capital and enlarging
the pool of investors for a given
category of assets. Cross-bor-
der regulatory harmonisation
would enable a much more
dynamic European market for
securitised corporate debt. 
• Insolvency legislation plays a
crucial role in determining the
financial attractiveness of debt
products, such as mezzanine
debt or high-yield bonds, which
are more useful to emerging
firms with rapid growth and no
physical collateral. Here, the
key consideration would be a
more predictable and inexpen-
sive framework. Insolvency
rules should allow for the rapid
workout of ailing companies,
with the possibility of quick
capital redeployment, and fairer
compromises between differ-
ent categories of stakeholders
than currently exist in many
countries
18. Previous
EU initiatives on
insolvency rules
have focused on set-
tling jurisdictional
conflicts and more
recently on trying to
diminish the ‘stigma of failure’
attached to unsuccessful entre-
preneurs. But it is even more
important to define clear rights
and processes in insolvency
situations, so that investors
can more easily provide subor-
dinated rather than senior debt
when it is conducive to
company development. 
• Tax policy should be reformed
in order to remove current
distortions, especially between
equity and debt. European
countries should revise the
current tax framework that
allows tax deductibility of
interest payments while gener-
ally submitting interest income
and dividends to different and
Source: Morgan Stanley, ‘European ABS Outlook
2007: RMBS, Credit Cards, SMEs’, December
2006.
Table 1: Issuance of asset-backed
securities in Europe by underlying
asset class, 2006
‘Competition policy
is perhaps the most
crucial enabler.’FINANCING EUROPE’S FAST MOVERS
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often complex tax treatments.
There is no economic rationale
for such distortions, and the
long run goal should be to
obtain a level playing field for all
types of financing, with tax reg-
ulations that are simple and
free of loopholes. Specifically,
the development of subordinat-
ed debt, which we advocate,
should not rest on tax arbitrage
relative to equity, but rather on
its intrinsic value as a flexible
tool for high-growth firms. Debt
and equity should receive
similar tax treatments at the
corporate and individual levels.
In late 2005, the US Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform
proposed taxing all corporate
cash flows at a flat rate,
expensing all new investments,
and eliminating business
interest expense deductions for
non-financial firms
19. Europe
should consider a similar move,
to be introduced gradually and
with great care to avoid any
double taxation. But in the long
run, the gains from a simple,
harmonised, and unbiased tax
system are too great to be
ignored.
Another significant tax and
regulatory issue are the
barriers to cross-border funds.
EU efforts to address this have
started with respect to venture
capital
20 and should be contin-
ued, so that the
fund manage-
ment industry
can benefit from
currently unat-
tainable scale
economies. 
• Prudential regulations that
hamper equity (including
private equity) investment by
institutional investors such as
pension funds and insurance
companies should be revised,
thus completing the already
significant improvements made
by many European countries in
this area over the past few
years. 
As these recommendations illus-
trate, the policy instruments most
likely to result in better financing
of emerging firms are in large part
in the hands of national govern-
ments, but momentum at the
European level would help achieve
the full benefits from financial
development. Moreover, concerns
about competition as well as
regulatory and tax arbitrage could
stifle reform if EU-level coordina-
tion is absent. EU-level discussion
could also help overcome the
s e v e r e  l a c k  o f  c o m p a r a b l e  d a t a
that currently hampers analysis in
this policy area.
Making the financial
system more sup-
portive of emerging
firms is therefore
within the scope of
EU policy initiatives,
just as financial
integration and financial stability.
Governments and established
companies have benefited
immensely from the integration of
Europe’s financial markets. The
next step is to leverage the same
strengths in order to foster the
growth of a new generation of suc-
cessful enterprises. There is a
goldmine here. In a time of fierce
global competition, Europe should
not leave it unexploited. 
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‘Momentum at EU level
would help achieve the
full benefits from
financial development.’
19www.taxreform
panel.gov.
20See Communication
of the European
Commission, ‘Removing
cross-border obstacles
to cross-border invest-
ments by venture
capital funds’, 21
December 2007.
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